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Kazakhstan and Central Asia:
regional perspectives
ZHARMUKHAMED ZARDYKHAN
Throughout the Soviet period, Kazakhstan has been regarded as a geographical
and historical extension of Southern Siberia. While the rest of Central Asia was
named Srednyaya aziya (Middle Asia), the term Srednyaya aziya i Kazakhstan
(Middle Asia and Kazakhstan) became used to denote the whole of Soviet
Central Asia. Historically, the area that is now Kazakhstan fell under the tsarist
rule about a century earlier than so-called Middle Asia and started to be
integrated into the imperial economy and administration . The Kazakh Khanate
was established by Janibek and Geray Khans, two sons of Barak Khan, in
the second half of the 15th century and encompassed the seceded tribes and
families that formerly belonged to the state of Nomadic Uzbeks under Abulkhayr
Khan (the grandfather of Shaybani Khan, the founder of the Shaybanide state),
when the state of Abulkhayr was severely weakened by the invasion of the
Jungars.
From the mid-15th century until the beginning of the 17th century, the Kazakh
Khanate was a uni ed political entity. In the 17th century the khanate broke up
and was divided into several separate khanates. According to Muhammed
Haydar Dughlat, the Kazakh Khanate was founded in Hijra 870 (1465–1466),
and the number of Kazakhs under the rule of Janibek and Geray reached 200,000
in 1468.1 From its establishment until its elimination, the Kazakh Khanate was
a rival to the Khiva and Khokand khanates, remnants of the Uzbek state, waging
several wars against them that resulted in many territories being passed from one
side to another.
The Central Asian republics have many things in common: common history
and ties, common problems of independent state building, and a perceived
common threat from Russia, China and extremist religious groups. At the
beginning of their ‘independent career’ they operated harmoniously within the
CIS by co-ordinating their actions. With the consolidation of their state indepen-
dence and the all-powerful local leaderships, however, the harmony among the
Central Asian republics turned into harsh rivalries, although their of cial rhetoric
of ‘eternal brotherhood’ was not lost. The Central Asian republics may still use
any possibility to hamper the other Central Asian states’ promotion, but there are
certain vulnerabilitie s that still force them to co-operate: their political oppo-
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sition (it is impossible to hear any criticism about the lack of democracy from
any leader of these states about the other), radical Islam, drug traf cking and, of
course, the Russian threat—though the priorities for every state are different. All
these states are still dependent on Russia, either politically or economically or
both, and they are in severe competition for Russian and Western aid and
investment.
Kazak–Uzbek relations and struggle for Central Asian leadership
Among the  ve Central Asian states, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the most
in uential ones with regard to their populations , economic and military power,
demographic compound, and geography. The population of each of the two
states is greater than that of the rest of Central Asia. By July 1995, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan had populations of 17.4 and 23.1 million respectively; their GDP
amounted to 55.2 and 54.5 billion dollars, and their armed forces had 40,000 and
25,000 men.2 Another feature that made Uzbekistan very in uential in the region
was its demographic structure: it has a relatively homogeneous population where
Uzbeks represent more than 75 per cent3 of the whole population, as well as
considerable Uzbek minorities in all other Central Asian republics. Under these
circumstances, the two countries compete for leadership in the region, where
Kazakhstan initiated regional co-operation and integration as a means to counter-
balance its vulnerability vis-à-vis Russia. Kyrgyzstan, with its large Uzbek
minority and several zones of dispute, tried to counterbalance the Uzbek threat
under an umbrella comprising the whole region. Turkmenistan, with its small
population and rich natural resources, tried to avoid any kind of integration in
order not to fall under Uzbek or Kazakh in uence. The ‘struggle’ between these
two countries was also apparent between the two leaders, presidents Nazarbayev
and Karimov: whereas the former became the innovator of any ideas of
co-operation, the latter consistently rejected them.4 For the most part, Kaza-
khstan’s initiatives to create a ‘Central Asian Union’ were a response to Russian
endeavours in Belarus and Ukraine. In addition, Kazakhstan’s co-operation with
the Central Asian states had been its  rst experience of ‘external’ co-operation
without Russian supervision.
The  rst meeting of the Central Asian leaders took place in Almaty on 23 June
1990, when then the First Secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, Nursultan
Nazarbayev, invited the Communist leaders of the Central Asian republics:
Niyazov of Turkmenistan, Makhkamov of Tajikistan, Karimov of Uzbekistan
and Masaliyev of Kyrgyzstan.5 Following the collapse of the USSR, the newly
independent regional states increased co-operation attempts, such as in Decem-
ber 1991 in a response to the Slavic Union. At a June 1990 summit, regional
councils met to solve common problems of cultural, scienti c and environmental
matters, which formed the  rst serious stage of institutionalizin g regional
co-operation. Another meeting of the Central Asian leaders was held in Ashka-

































KAZAKHSTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA
a Turkic–Muslim atmosphere, but the ongoing war with Armenia hampered the
latter’s co-operation with Central Asia.
One of the most important meetings among the regional powers was held in
early January 1993 in Tashkent, where the term Tsentral’naya aziya (Central
Asia) was formally adopted to designate the Central Asian states including
Kazakhstan, instead of Srednyaya aziya i Kazakhstan (Middle Asia and Kaza-
khstan).7 One of the most important conclusions of the meeting was the creation
of a common market and a plan to co-ordinate economic policies.8 The next
stage of regional co-operation was launched mainly by Kazakhstan and Uzbek-
istan with Kyrgyzstan’s indispensable participation in every project. Turk-
menistan followed its policy of ‘neutralism’ and Tajikistan ran into a civil war
with Russia’s instigation and support. In January 1994, the presidents of
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed bilateral agreements on the creation of a
common market, the abolishment of customs checkpoints, and free border
crossing for their citizens.9 Later that year Kyrgyzstan also joined the ‘Kazakh–
Uzbek Union’ and the trilateral agreement was signed on 30 April 1994.10
During the Almaty summit held on 8 June 1994, the three countries established
an Interstate Council, an Executive Committee and founded the Council of Prime
Ministers, the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Council of Defence Minis-
ters.11 On 8 July 1994, the participants established the Central Asian Bank for
Co-operation and Development facilitating interstate  scal transactions, but in
reality, most of these gestures of ardent friendship and co-operation simply
remained on paper and the two republics followed independent paths: Uzbek-
istan was more concerned with its domestic ‘Islamist’ opposition and actively
‘participated’ in the Tajik–Afghan crisis, while Kazakhstan continued its ‘inte-
grationist’ policy and nation-building process. Not surprisingly , Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan did not participate in Nazarbayev’s conference on Eurasian Union
organized in Almaty.12 Also, the Uzbek side hesitated with regard to the idea of
Central Asian trilateral integration after the marriage of Nazarbayev’s youngest
daughter and Akayev’s son.
Long-lasting tradition: the border issue
One of the most vulnerable issues between the Central Asian states is that of
their borders. This issue can be considered a legacy of the Soviet period, which
created them arti cially with no regard to prevalent ethnic, geographical, or
economic conditions . In addition to these borders, some purely arti cial ethnic-
ities had been created, such as the Karakalpaks, whose titular land was initially
a part of the Kazakh ASSR. It later was transferred to the RSFSR, and had
 nally been incorporated into Uzbekistan as the Karakalpak ASSR in 1936. The
border disputes between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan had been exacerbated by
their status during Soviet times: the borders were simply the domestic adminis-
trative lines between the two Soviet republics and were prone to be changed,
since none were demarcated nor delineated.


































operation, and Mutual Assistance. The treaty guarantees the principle of non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs and does ‘recognize and respect
territorial integrity and inviolabilit y of existing borders between Kazakhstan and
Uzbekistan, and denounce any kind of encroachment on these borders. Any
establishment and change of the state border regime would be implemented on
mutual agreement.’13 The approximate length of the Kazakh–Uzbek border is
230 km.14
For the last few years, a growing number of incidents occurred in the border
zone and became more violent. The two countries started to increase the number
of troops in this ‘friendly zone’. Drug smuggling and illegal immigration also
increased. In one month—January 2000—several armed clashes occurred be-
tween the border guards of the two countries, sometimes involving local
populations , especially in the disputed zone that comprises an area of more than
15,000 hectares.15
On 25 January 2000, Uzbek border guards in their armoured personnel carrier
penetrated the Kazakh territories for 50 km and started to mark out a line of
60 km long16 (according to Nezavisimaya gazeta, they advanced 50 km and
delineated a zone of about 22,000 hectares).17 The Kazakh government, in a
diplomatic note sent to Tashkent, called the occasion an ‘invasion of the territory
of a sovereign state’18 and the Kazakh Foreign Minister Erlan Idrisov stated that
Kazakhstan ‘will not give up an inch of land’.19 The Kazakh side had started its
troop positioning in September 1999.20 Until that time, it was an unguarded
zone. Following the incident, both sides started negotiations on the demarcation
of the border while both parties continued to increase the number of the border
troops and facilities. Upon the note of protest from the Kazakh side, the Uzbek
Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated that ‘there are not and will not be
any territorial tension between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. … The subject of
border disputes between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan is being “arti cially puffed
up” these days, while the issue involves only delimitation and demarcation of the
border between the two countries.’21 The border incident that stirred up a
diplomatic clash within a couple of days settled down through negotiations by
bilateral working groups, starting the process of demarcation. According to the
Kazakh Foreign Minister, by June 2000, 40 km of borderline had already been
demarcated.22 In July 2000, Kazakhstan started negotiations on the delimitation
and demarcation of the state border with the Republic of Kyrgyzstan.23 Thus,
Kazakhstan started to acquire one of the most important requirements of an
independent state—real and recognized borders. Interestingly, the rightist
Kazakh parties, such as Alash and Azat, which use any possible excuse to
criticize and picket the Russian embassy in con icts involving Russia, did not
forward their protests to the Uzbek side after the border accident.24
Kazakhstan and the Kazakhs in Uzbekistan
Another speci c feature that makes Kazakh–Uzbek relations tense and which

































KAZAKHSTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA
the Kazakh minority in Uzbekistan and the Uzbek minority in Kazakhstan. As
a result of Soviet state-building practice, particularly, the creation of state
nationalism, several parts of Kazakh territories passed to Uzbekistan, and
reciprocally, some Uzbek territories passed to Kazakhstan. Ironically, some
territories, such as the Makhta–Aral district,25 passed from one side to another
several times.
According to the 1989 census, some 808,000 Kazakhs lived in Uzbekistan and
some 332,000 Uzbeks in Kazakhstan; today these numbers are supposed to reach
at least 1.2 million and 400,000 respectively, and because of the similar
birth-rate among the two societies the ratio is not likely to change.26 There are
also considerable Uzbek minorities in all other Central Asian countries: Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. In this regard, Kazakhstan seems rela-
tively free of Uzbek in uence, while the Kazakh minority in Uzbekistan, on the
contrary, seems to be more in uential. After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
a number of Uzbekistani Kazakhs migrated to Kazakhstan for permanent
residence. The Kazakhs in Uzbekistan, the second largest Kazakh community
abroad after that of China, are spread all over the country, but the largest number
of them (more than 500,000) live in Central Uzbekistan (Tashkent Oblast,
Tashkent City, Syr-Darya Oblast).27 A great number of Uzbeks in Kazakhstan
live in the Chimkent region amounting to some 280,000 people.28
After obtaining independence, the two countries did not intend to involve
these minorities in their foreign policy. Several trivial clashes between ethnic
Kazakhs and Uzbeks had been controlled and calmed down by of cials.
Therefore, the claims of both sides—Uzbeks’ aspirations to incorporate some
regions of Southern Kazakhstan, the former territories of the Khokand Khanate,
into Uzbekistan and Kazakhs’ aspirations on Uzbekistan’s present capital
Tashkent, allegedly the lands of the Kazakh Ulu Jüz (Great Horde)—have not so
far been taken up by the of cial organs of either country.
Tajik–Afghan crisis and ‘radical Islam’
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the newly independent states
regarded Communism as an impending threat to the former Soviet territories.
This attitude provided support for the republics’ leadership, either from the
West, from Russia or from other former Soviet states, during the period of
transition when the republics were severely dependent on external aid. In this
regard, Kazakhstan was not an exception. The Kazakh leadership was aware of
the fact that without democratization, integration of the state’s economy into the
world economy, and elimination of an anti-Western orientation in foreign policy
the country could not receive foreign aid that was an indispensable condition for
the leadership’s survival. However, towards the end of the 1990s the threat of
Communism lost its former acuteness and the West became concerned with
democratization and human rights, which became the prerequisite for economic
aid. Thus, the task of preventing the spread of ‘radical Islam’, terrorism and


































smuggling became the mean to show the region’s key role in the world’s
stability, to obtain foreign aid and to avoid becoming a legitimate cause for anti-
democratic sanctions. In this regard, Afghanistan with its ongoing civil war, and
Tajikistan, the unstable country in Central Asia, were presented as the cradle of
an ‘Islamic International’ and the ‘bow of Islamic extremism’. The problem of
Islamic extremism, cradled somehow between Russia and the USA, besides
facilitating foreign support provides regional leaders with justi cation for auto-
cratic action.
Kazakhstan, due to its remoteness to the areas of tensions and the lack of
extremist Islamic tradition and movements, is not as vulnerable as the other
Central Asian states to the Islamist movement, but it also tries to ‘bene t’ from
the threat. In contrast to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan was less
concerned with and did not actively support the Northern Alliance in
Afghanistan. Its peacekeeping troops in Tajikistan were under the jurisdiction of
the CIS joint forces and never actively participated in serious combat or
operations. T. Akimov asserted that Kazakhstan dealt only with the criminal and
legal extension of the Afghan crisis and was interested in a stable and peaceful
Afghanistan as an alternative route for its mineral resources to the open sea.29
The Kazakh government has expressed its apprehension about the growth of
Islamic extremism on every occasion. Especially after the Russian involvement
in Chechnya, it became a motto of Kazakh foreign policy. Kazakhstan’s attitude
towards Islamic extremism, separatism and terrorism keeps it in good terms with
other Central Asian states, which have direct borders with other Islamic states
and also leads Russia to tone down the protests against ‘persecution’ of Russians
in Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan tries to present itself to Russia as a shield against
drug-traf cking and Islamic extremism, and tells Russia that it should ‘leave
them on their own and do not interfere and they will do everything; only your
interference and criticism obstruct their productivity ’.30
The Kazakh government supported peaceful resolution of the Afghan war: the
then Kazakh Foreign Minister Tokayev stated that Kazakhstan ‘supports bring-
ing an end to the war in Afghanistan and beginning talks on the resolution of the
con ict’.31 In contrast to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan preferred not to
condemn the Taliban regime as the only reason for bloodshed and seemed even
to refrain from recognizing the Rabbani government as the sole legitimate power
representing Afghanistan. At the meeting of  ve Central Asian presidents held
in Almaty on 28 February 1997, the Kazakh president did not make open
accusations against the Kandahar regime, as the Uzbek and Tajik presidents did,
and no special decision was taken.32 In May 2000, after Sergey Yastrzhembsky,
the aide of President Putin, stated that Russia might use preventive air-strikes on
Afghanistan, the Kazakh president said that there was no need for such
air-strikes.33 After Yastrzhembsky’s statement, the Taliban government warned
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan that they would be held responsible for Russian
attacks and threatened to use force against them. According to Erlan Karin,
director of the Central Asian Agency of Political Research, it was not surprising

































KAZAKHSTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA
because ‘Tajikistan—no matter how we say—is a Russian colony and to some
extent—Uzbekistan—under the circumstances of its peculiar relations with
Russia …’.34 In February 2000, a plane hijacked by Afghans was permitted to
land at Aktöbe (Aktyubinsk) airport in Kazakhstan and was provided with food
and fuel before taking off to London.
In fact, the Afghan war and the spread of extremism are still the most
important excuse for the Kazakh government to increase its military power
without annoying neighbouring states and to regulate the activity of domestic
opposition . After 1999, particularly after the border incidents with Uzbekistan,
Kazakhstan started to modernize and improve the combat ability of its armed
forces. In May 1997, the then Kazakh Defence Minister, Mukhtar Altynbayev,
stated that Kazakhstan plans in the future ‘to transfer its army to work on a
professional basis’.35 Following the border incident, Kazakhstan intended to
increase its defence expenditures and provide extra tax privileges for arm
producers.36 The Kazakh Defence Ministry ordered a number of the newest
Russian military technologies , including several SU-27 and MIG-31  ghters and
the S-300 air-defence missile system, which started being delivered in 1999.
Because of military reforms and new weapon deliveries, Kazakhstan, with its
army of only 68,000 personnel became the ‘most combat capable [country] in
Central Asia’.37 In January 2000, Marat Tazhin, Security Council Secretary of
the Republic of Kazakhstan, told that Kazakhstan planned to allocate at least 1
per cent of GDP to defence. The previous year’s military spending of US$110
million was equal only to 0.86 per cent of GDP.38 Beside military deliveries
from Russia and privileges granted to domestic weapon producers, Kazakhstan
has tried to gain support from external powers, especially NATO members.
During the visit of the Kazakh Defence Minister Sat Tokpakbayev to the USA,
the countries agreed to the joint manoeuvres of the Central Asian Battalion in
Kazakhstan in September 2000. Another agreement was signed with the Turkish
Defence Ministry in December 1999 and the Turkish side granted US$600,000
non-refundable help for modernizing communication systems of the Defence
Ministry of the Republic of Kazakhstan.39 During the in ltration of the Islamic
militants in Southern Kyrgyzstan in September 1999, it was reported that the
Kazakh Air Force bombed the militants’ positions . However, the participation of
the Kazakh forces was denied by the Kazakh Prime Minister Nurlan Balgym-
bayev, although he admitted that Kazakhstan provided some help to Kyrgyzstan
with equipment and gear.40
Some of the above mentioned developments and changes have been compiled
in a single document, the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Kazakhstan,
which—approved by a presidential decree on 10 February 2000—renewed the
former doctrine adopted two years previously. Certain issues that did not take
place in the former doctrine have been con rmed in a new one. Interestingly, the
doctrine says that ‘the nearest surroundings of the country might be either
potential allies or ‘irritants’ for the problem of security’; also ‘the excessive
quantitative and qualitative increase in the military power of some countries’ are


































Kazakhstan and the Caspian Oil
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kazakh economy had considerably
declined especially because of the drop in the production rate of oil and gas, the
most important pillars of the Kazakh economy. In this regard, petroleum and gas
production in the Caspian Sea region became probably the most important
source for the state budget and supply of hard currency. Besides practical gains,
the existence of rich oil and gas reserves improves the  nancial credibility of the
state and attracts foreign investment. Between 1997 and 1999, US$2.7 billion
was directly invested in the oil and gas industry of Kazakhstan.42 Kazakhstan’s
rich oil reserves and the existence of several ‘prospective’ transportation routes
grant it some political bargaining power, which the new republic is likely to
utilize.
Unlike the rest of its foreign policy, the Caspian oil policy of Kazakhstan
presents diverse perspective in international arena: the country seeks close
relations with Russia and uses its pipelines as the only functioning export route
for now; it encourages co-operation with Western petroleum companies to
supply its oil to the world. Also there is the possibility of co-operation with
regional states, such as Turkey, Iran and China. Commenting on diversity,
Kazakh president said that ‘here we are interested in a practical side of the
matter, not political. Kazakhstan should start the transportation of its oil to the
world market as soon and as pro tably as possible.’43 On 10 September 1999,
a protocol that con rms the will of two countries regarding the transportation of
the Caspian oil via Turkey to the world market was signed in Ankara between
Kazakhstan and Turkey.44
For Kazakhstan, it is crucial to delineate the dividing water lines in the
Caspian Sea as soon as possible. Despite mention of a verbal consensus on the
matter between the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan,45 Kazakhstan is
anxious about the growth of Russian activity in the region, including its
investment of US$9 billion to develop the petroleum-producing infrastructure of
its sector.46 Kazakhstan still claims its rights over the Khvalynskoye deposit in
the border zone that was recently explored by Russian LUK-Oil. In early 2000,
the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation prohibited the trans-
portation of Kazakh oil via Russian pipelines, arguing that the export of Kazakh
oil via Russia could not be regarded as transit, because the oil that initially  ows
from Kazakhstan and that is exported at Russian ports (mixed with Russian oil)
is not the same oil.47 This problem was solved during Nazarbayev’s of cial visit
to Moscow in June 2000, when the Russian Ministry of Energy stated that the
transportation of Kazakh oil was in Russia’s interests.48
Sino–Kazakh relations: an alternative pole?
Following the collapse of the Soviet regime and its economic ties and regional
co-operation, Kazakhstan started to search for alternative relations with regional

































KAZAKHSTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA
sovereignty while also providing cheaper goods and exporting Kazakhstan’s
domestic production. Any possible alternative to the Russian economy would
have lessened Kazakhstan’s dependency on Russia and would contribute to the
republic’s independence. Under these circumstances, China started to dominate
the region and had certain advantages that strengthened its position. First, China
with its enormous population, export–import potential, and rapidly growing
industry, provides a lucrative market for Kazakhstan’s gas- and oil-dependent
economy and is able to replace Russian imports with its cheaper basic consumer
goods. Kazakhstan has a direct border with China so it might avoid Russia’s
political pressure and in uence in exporting its own production, especially that
of the oil sector. Second, China could certainly attract Kazakhstan with its
‘economic miracle of achieving rapid modernisation without sacri cing political
control’.49 While Western powers, and sometimes even Russia, deal with the
political and legal sides of development (such as lessening of state control over
the economy, granting equal opportunitie s and developing means of political
supervision) , China has never urged Kazakhstan to install democratic institutions
or to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in the republic. Another reason for the
burst of trade and economic relations between the two countries, as Shireen
Hunter pointed out, is the highly complementary natures of the two economies,
whereas the instability in Afghanistan and sanctions over Iran makes China the
‘shortest and cheapest outlet … to the outside world’.50
According to Chinese customs statistics, Sino–Kazakh trade amounted to
US$390 million in 1995 (an increase of 17.7 per cent from 1994 trade), where
the Kazakh exports amounted to US$324.5 million (increasing by 47.5 per cent)
and imports from China amounted to US$65.5 million (a decrease of 37.5 per
cent); in 1996 the volume of trade between the two countries reached US$497.5
million.51 Trade and economic relations between China and Kazakhstan are
likely to grow considerably and have already made China its greatest trading
partner after Russia. Not surprisingly , the balance of trade is prone to change in
China’s favour. Economic ties between the two countries are also bolstered by
co-operation in scienti c, cultural and military  elds, such as the Agreement on
Scienti c and Technological Co-operation signed on 30 December 1994, in
Almaty52 and an agreement on supplying the Chinese Navy with Kazakh-made
torpedoes.53 For Kazakhstan, especially in recent years, Sino–Kazakh co-oper-
ation in the  eld of oil production and transportation via China has gained vital
importance.
According to Viktor Gilinsky, world oil consumption will increase to 90
million barrels per day, in which Asian oil consumption will increase.54 By the
year 2005, Chinese demands for oil imports are expected to increase to 2 million
barrels per day, or about 38 per cent of total consumption.55 As a result of
China’s growing need for oil, an important contract was signed by the Kazakh
State Committee on Investments, the Aktyubmunaygaz Company of Kazakhstan
and the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) on 26 September 1997.
According to the contract, which will be valid for 20 years, CNPC will provide


































receive US$3.16 billion by means of income and local taxes, bonus and excise
duties.56 Another agreement signed in Almaty in September 1997 stipulates the
construction of a pipeline from Western Kazakhstan to Western China, which
would become an alternative to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium established in
1992 to transport the Tengiz oil from Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port
of Novorossiisk .57 At present, the transportation of Kazakh oil to China is
provided mainly by railway. In 1998, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was
to buy as much as one million tonnes of oil from Kazakhstan via railway and
according to experts, might become Kazakhstan’s major oil consumer.58 Then
acting Prime Minister of Kazakhstan Ahmedzhan Esimov stated that a package
of Kazakh–Chinese agreements on Caspian oil and its transportation was
estimated at US$9.5 billion.59 The possible transportation of Kazakh oil via
China to Japan and other Southeast Asian countries is also being considered.
Kazakhstan, hampered by its disadvantageous position of being a land-locked
country and highly dependent on Russian transportation routes, considers the
Chinese alternative as one of the most important and pro table solutions.
Kazakhstan has direct rail, air and highway links with China and strives to
develop their diversity and capacity. During a summer 1991 visit to China,
president Nazarbayev offered to extend the current Almaty–Urumchi and Beijing
air routes and use it as a transit base from Kazakhstan to Japan and South Korea.
Also he offered to increase the volume of transportation of the railroad line
between China and Russia via Kazakhstan. Another agreement signed during the
September 1995 visit of Nazarbayev to China dealt with Kazakhstan’s trade
exchanges with Paci c and Southeast Asian countries to be conducted via the
Chinese port of Lianyungang saving some 5000 km in transport—the distance
from Kazakhstan to this port is 3500 km, while that to the nearest Russian Far
Eastern port is 8500 km.60
Eastern Turkestan and Kazakhstan’s policy
The Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Province (XUAP), or Eastern Turkestan, has
a great strategic, economic and political importance for Sino–Kazakh relations.
Recognition of Chinese supremacy over the region and ‘non-intervention ’ in
domestic affairs has been a long-standing condition for Kazakhstan’s relations
with China. Kazakhstan has certain historical linkages with Eastern Turkestan,
which was formally incorporated into the Chinese Empire in 1884. In 1933 and
again in 1944, an independent Eastern Turkestan Republic composed mainly of
Uighurs and Kazakhs was established.61 According to the Chinese statistics,
some 1,111,718 ethnic Kazakhs live in Eastern Turkestan62 (Kazakhs claim that
there are at least 1,500,000) and a considerable number of ethnic Uighurs (the
largest ethnic group in Eastern Turkestan many of whom  ed to Kazakhstan in
the 1930s through to the early 1960s)63 live in Kazakhstan. The Muslim
population of China, which is severely suppressed by the Chinese government,
suffered from a policy of assimilation and planned immigration of the Chinese

































KAZAKHSTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA
regime, making the People’s Republic of China (PRC) government anxious,
especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the growth of ethnic and
religious awareness throughout Central Asia. According to controversia l of cial
Chinese  gures, among the Province’s total population of 15.2 million, the
Uighurs represent the largest ethnic community with 7.19 million (47.5 per cent),
the Kazakhs 7.3 per cent, the ethnic Chinese Muslims number 782,000 (4.5 per
cent) and some other ethnic groups such as Kyrgyz and Mongols number
140,000 (0.8 per cent) each.64 While 60.1 per cent of the region’s entire
population consist of Muslims, the number of Chinese has risen to 5.7 million
(37.6 per cent).65 The ethnic Kazakh minority in Eastern Turkestan represents the
largest Kazakh community among 4.5 million Kazakhs living outside Kaza-
khstan. In contrast to the People’s Republic of China’s other regions, Eastern
Turkestan is still largely controlled by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), not
the Armed Police and the province still suffers from the nuclear weapons testing
centre at Lob Nor, which also places a great number of military staff in the
region.66
With the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic
China the Kazakh government recognized that,
[T]he government of the People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government of
China and Taiwan is an indivisible part of the Chinese territory. The Government of the
Republic of Kazakhstan guarantees, that it would not establish any kind of of cial relations
with Taiwan.67
Although, there is no such direct of cial statement on the non-involvement of
Kazakhstan in Eastern Turkestan, the Kazakh government guarantees this under
the guise of the struggle against separatism, terrorism and ethnic strife. In order
to satisfy its southern neighbour and preventing it from demanding security
guarantees, the Kazakh government not only refrains from displaying concern
for its fellow Kazakhs or other kin communities in Eastern Turkestan and their
problems, but also commits itself ‘to prevent advocates of an ‘East[ern]
Turkestan Republic’ from working against China and interfering in Xinjiang
from the territory of Kazakhstan’.68 In July 1996, the two countries signed a
‘treaty on mutual extradition of criminals and criminal suspects’.69 Following
several occasions of extradition of ethnic Uighurs who had  ed to Kazakhstan,
the republic was regarded as having ‘collaborated with Chinese authorities and
violated international treaties by peremptorily returning to China those ethnic
Uighurs from China who had  ed to Kazakhstan and claimed political refugee
status by reason of racial persecution’.70
In addition to the province’s strategic and demographic importance, Eastern
Turkestan plays a key economic role for China, Kazakhstan and the entire
Central Asian region. The Treaty of Principles and Main Trends of the Pro-
motion of Co-operation between the province and the then Kazakh SSR was
signed during President Nazarbayev’s visit to XUAP.71 In 1991, the total volume
of trade between the Central Asian republics and the Province amounted to


































government granted  ve cities in the province the same rights as the ten ‘open
cities’ on the East coast.73 The growing relations with Kazakhstan also spurred
the economic development of Eastern Turkestan, in which more than 70 per cent
of the region’s external economic exchanges were conducted with Central Asian
countries,74 attracting investments to the region and improving its welfare.
The Shanghai forum
The Shanghai Agreement on Con dence-building in the Military Field in Border
Areas, which created the ‘Shanghai Five’, was signed on 26 April 1996, between
the People’s Republic of China and four former Soviet neighbouring states:
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia. The agreement stipulates the
mutual dislocation of military troops and armament, except border troops, from
a border zone of 100 km; the parties agree to refrain from allowing military
manoeuvres to target another side and limit the scale of manoeuvres and the
number of staff attending them.75 Also, signatories to the treaty would be able
to observe military exercises in order to prevent any dangerous military activi-
ties.76
The Republic of Kazakhstan actively participated in the Shanghai Five
meetings. This was to its advantage:  rst, it was a forum where the republic
could contact and observe its two great neighbours; second, the implementation
of the agreement could free it from the heavy burden of armament and avoid
unfavourable tension; and last, the Shanghai Five was more than just a military
or border agreement providing certain economic co-operation opportunities .
Initially, Russia sponsored talks with China and Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan on their common border issues and the limitation of troops and
weapons. In April 1995, negotiations were held in Moscow between the working
groups of the countries.77
At the summit meeting of the Shanghai Five leaders held in Bishkek, on 25
August 1999, the participants signed a declaration in which the members
expressed their resoluteness ‘not to permit the use of the territories of their
countries for the organization of activities violating the sovereignty, security, and
public order of any of the  ve states.’78 Besides lending support for the creation
of a nuclear-free zone in Central Asia, the participants unof cially condemned
separatism and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’.79
The meeting of the Shanghai Five held in July 2000 in Dushanbe, was
distinguished from the previous meetings in several ways. The Dushanbe summit
was the  rst meeting of the Shanghai Five series attended by the new Russian
President Vladimir Putin whose neo-imperialist policies forced him to keep close
to his eastern neighbours. In February 2000, Putin, then acting president and
Prime Minister, appointed Vladimir Vorobyev as the special envoy to the
Shanghai Five.80 The Shanghai Five summit had great importance for the new
Russian leader and probably was the only forum where he could get of cial
support for his ‘anti-separatist ’ and ‘anti-terrorist’ operations in Chechnya.
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‘Islamic extremism’ whatsoever. Its greatest threat is Russian separatism in the
north and the border dispute with China. The Dushanbe summit was attended by
the Uzbek President Islam Karimov, who did not attend the previous meetings.
The leader of Uzbekistan, whose country does not have common borders with
Russia and China, is deeply concerned with the struggle against his opposition
that has been alleged to co-operate with Islamic militants.
Before the summit started, the foreign ministers of the member states signed
a communiqué on the joint struggle against terrorism, even committing them-
selves to large-scale anti-terrorist operations. Additionally , the sides decided to
co-operate in the economic and cultural spheres.81 The leaders of member states
again expressed their opposition to interference in the interior affairs of other
states even ‘under the excuse of humanitarian intervention and protection of
human rights’.82 Besides Uzbekistan, some other regional states, namely Mongo-
lia, India and Iran, expressed their interest in co-operation with the Shanghai
Five, henceforth being called ‘Shanghai Forum’.83
The border issue and Chinese expansionism
The issue of the 1700-km84 long Sino–Kazakh border, a legacy of the Russian
imperial regime, was settled by the St Petersburg Treaty of 1881 and its further
provisions of 1883, 1904 and 1915.85 This border is one of the most vulnerable
chains in Kazakh national security. Throughout history, China expressed its
imperial mood to expand in Central Asia through incorporation of lands and
assimilation of native population. In the past, and especially during Mao’s rule,
China laid certain claims on Kazakh border territories and intended to change the
border, namely in 1968 and 1971. In 1992, after Kazakhstan became an
independent state, the Chinese ambassador to Kazakhstan argued that the
Kazakh–Chinese border needed correction.86 It was said that the Chinese term Xi
Yu, meaning ‘Northwest province’ in Chinese is an ‘historical designation for an
area encompassing much of Central Asia’.87 The Chinese territorial claims are
underpinned by the great involvement of China in Kazakh economy, immi-
gration and the settlement of Chinese in Kazakhstan. While in the 1989 census
no Chinese were counted, it is estimated that some 300,000–350,000 Chinese
live in the republic today.88 Also, it is well known that the Chinese armed forces
located in the region are superior in armament and number to the armed forces
of Russia and the CIS countries located in Central Asia.89 Also the Chinese
nuclear testing centre situated at Lob Nor, is only 900 km from the Kazakh
border and only 1200 km from Almaty. From 1964 to 1992, 38 nuclear bombs
were tested there and those before 1980 were exploded in the air, causing
harmful radiation for the whole region.90 This actual Chinese threat prevents
Kazakhstan and other Central Asian states from distancing itself too much from
the Russian Army. It remains the only power to rely on in case of Chinese
invasion, despite the Chinese promise given to Kazakhstan on 8 February 1995,
that ‘it would never use nuclear weapons against it’.91


































between China and Kazakhstan, was addressed by signing an ‘historic’ border
accord on 26 April 1994—exactly two years before of the signing of the
Shanghai Agreement—during the visit of the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng to
Kazakhstan.92 Negotiations on de ning today’s Sino–Kazakh border began in the
1970s and ‘were near completion when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991’,
leaving a stretch of 73 km unde ned.93 Following the agreement, the joint
Kazakh–Chinese commission on the border demarcation was established, and in
1996 and July 1998, the two sides signed two complementary agreements on
border issues, during the visits of the Chinese President Jiang Zemin to
Kazakhstan.94 During the negotiations , the Chinese side pressed its claims over
a 364-square-mile area of disputed territories and launched a project of diverting
up to 40 per cent of border rivers to China. Under pressure Kazakhstan agreed
to cede 157 square-miles to China.95
The Kazakh Government tried to derive bene t from the Shanghai Five
meetings at every possible stage, including during tête-à-tête meetings between
the Kazakh and Chinese presidents. During the Bishkek Round of the Shanghai
Five, the two presidents ‘completely solved all border problems between the two
countries’.96 During the later summit of the Shanghai Forum, President Nazar-
bayev also stated that the border problems were actually solved.97 In June 2000,
other negotiations on the issue of border rivers were held in China, after which
the Chinese side decided ‘to take Kazakhstani interests into account when
outlining all the projects on construction of any objects on and/or along the
rivers crossing the borders of the two countries’.98
Conclusion
Today, Kazakhstan—as any of the Central Asian ex-Soviet states—is busy
solving its domestic and economic problems. This facet of their interests and
policy makes the present-day intra-Central Asian relations considerably different
from the early years of independence, when despite their economic and political
controversies their co-ordinated policy and attitude was the key to their survival
vis-à-vis Russia. Despite its few years of independence and severe political and
economic dependence on its neighbours, Kazakhstan seems today able to afford
a more pragmatic policy in economic and strategic terms. The decree on the visa
regime for the Kyrgyzstani citizens is itself an evidence of remarkable changes.
The analysis of Kazakhstan’s regional policy since its ‘catapult to indepen-
dence’, especially that of the last few years, shows that two major trends will
dominate its future regional policy: the establishment of interactions with the
neighbouring countries favourable in economic terms and the entrenchment of
balanced (or counterbalanced) relations with Russia and China.
Ironically, the complexity of regional interests encourages the development
and expansion of multilateral institutions and unions in the region but impedes
their functioning and imposition, providing countries like Kazakhstan with de
jure umbrella but without any serious controlling body. Kazakhstan seems fully
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States, where Kazakhstan was one of the most active participants and the
initiator of a number of forums, projects and treaties. Today, a similar trend
seems valid for the Shanghai Union, which expands its ‘jurisdiction’ over more
and more members and problems and where Kazakhstan plays a similar active
and ‘expansionist ’ role. In this respect, the declaration of Nursultan Nazarbayev
that the Shanghai Union should also deal with ecological and humanitarian
issues apart from its political and economic questions and should strengthen
its co-operation with other international and regional organizations , such as
ASEAN,99 is worthy of being scrutinized.
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